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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VINAL MILLETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

GLORIA LANGSTON,
Defendant a.nd Appellant.

Case
No. 8750

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The problems presented in this case are: What
business agreement existed between the parties for
establishing a trailer court in Moab, Utah; has such
agreement been terminated and if so, when; and what
are the present obligations of each party to the other.
There was no written agreement between the parties
(R. 45), and their testimony shows substantial disagreement on the above questions. The nature of the business
agreement, its duration, and the obligations can be
established only from the legal implications of the
evidence.
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In May, 1954, Vinal Millett (Respondent here, but
Plaintiff below and so identified herein) discussed
trailer court possibilities with his niece, Gloria Langston, (Appellant here, but Defendant below and so
referred to herein). Plaintiff had no specific property
in mind (R. 46, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 4). He discussed Moab,
Utah, as a location because of its boom-town character,
but had never gone there to investigate (R. 46, 79).
At that time, Plaintiff, a carpenter (R. 36), was
seasonally unemployed (R. 51), and was on unemploy-ment relief (R. 51). Plaintiff was a favorite brother of
Defendant's mother (R. 104), and family ties had been
very close (R. 106). Plaintiff needed financial help (R.
107), and in March and on May 17, 1954, Defendant
gave Plaintiff $60 to pay on a loan, a portion of which
was for purchase of Plaintiff's car (R. 57, 83). Plaintiff
was anxious to find security in some permanent work
(R. 107, 108), and states he consented to let Defendant
participate in his plan for trailer court development
because she had a little money (R. 36, 37). Defendant
states she was investigating a possible way to help him
(Ex. 4: Dep. GL 7).
In May, 1954, Defendant and her mother, together
with Plaintiff, drove to ~[oab (R,. 36}. The parties
proposed to rent land and establish a trailer court, with
the Defendant supplying necessary funds until money
could be obtained from the operations, a11d with the
Plaintiff providing the "'"ork required (R. 3·7, 46, 48,
79). Plaintiff stated:
2
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''Well, we were to go in on this, and she was
to furnish the necessary cash down payment and
cash as far as it went until we got on paying
basis and me stay down there and put it over.''
(Ex. 2: Dep. VM 4; R. 37.)
Efforts to rent property in Moab were unsuccessful
(R. 79). About May 20, 1954, Defendant purchased five
( 5) acres from a. Frank Peterson for $1,100 an acre,
with payments of $1200 down, and $100 a month thereafter (R. 48, 81). Defendant paid the earnest money of
$500, and the balance of the $1,200 down payment, took
title in her name, and has made the payments subsequently (R. 54, 86, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 17). Planitiff signed
no papers, made no payments on the land, and assumed
no obligations for paying for the land (R. 48, 54, 55, 56) ;
nor was he to provide any money at any time (R. 56).
Plaintiff states he demanded a one-third interest in
the land for himself and one-third for his brother, Ira,
and that the Defendant refused to include their names
in the transaction (R. 36). Plaintiff alleges and the
Defendant denies that their names were to be included
later (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 7, 8, R. 82). The Plaintiff, the
Defendant and a real estate man named Bill Allen were
present (R. 45). The Plaintiff recalled that Mrs.
Boshard, his sister and the Defendant's mother, was
also present (R. 45), but Mrs. Boshard denies this (R.
102).
The parties proceeded to establish a trailer court
on the land purchased by Defendant (R. 45), with
Plaintiff moving to Moab in May, 1954 and remaining
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there until July, 1955 (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 5). During that
period improvements were made and installations made
for a trailer court. These include six small rental cabins
'
two bathhouses for use of trailer occupants, two wells,
and two septic tanks, together with necessary bulldozer
work, plumbing, electrical work, and similar work. (Ex.
2: Dep. VM 8, 12, R. 27 Answer #26, R. 90).
Plaintiff contends that all materials necessary for
seven cabins were secured from Ira Millett and delivered
precut to Moab in a truck hired by Defendant (R. 49,
50). The first cabin was erected by Ira in order to
show Plaintiff how to assemble such cabins (R. 72, 113).
The remainder were erected by Plaintiff with some help
(R. 37, 38). Plaintiff states that the materials obtained
from Ira were to entitle Ira to a one-third share of the
property (R. 49, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 21). Ira stated he
had received some $25, or $41 from Defendant, but no
other payments (R. 70). He never submitted a bill to
Defendant (R. 72). Defendant maintains that the
materials "rere acquired by Ira in his name because he
operated a sawmill and small lumber ~Tard and it was
thought he could get better prices, but that she made
payments for such materials directly to Tri-State Lumber Co. and to Frank I. Larsen Lumber Company and
that she does not O"\Ye Ira any balance ( R. 111). She
admits Plaintiff may ha.Ye obtained some 2 x 2s from
Ira but that she 'vas not a party to any such transaction
and knows no details (R. 113). The parties agree that
Gloria terminated a11y relations "\Yith Ira shortly after
Plaintiff moved to l\!oab (R. 39, 71).
4
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Defendant signed a new contract to acquire additional acres, making a total of 14.57 acres, and agreed
to pay an additional $100 a month on the contract (R.
81). Defendant states the purchase was made by her
after being offered to her by the real estate man (R.
81). Plaintiff states he arranged the second purchase
and said he would take the deal if Defendant did not
(R. 54).
The Plaintiff remained in Moab from May, 1954,
until the middle of July, 1955 (R. 40, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 8),
except for six or more visits to Salt Lake City to see
his wife (R. 53). During this period the Plaintiff had
no other employment or source of income (R. 52, Ex. 2:
Dep. VJ\1 26), except for the month of June, 1955, when
he worked as a carpenter on the new Moab post office
(R. 40). During Plaintiff's stay in Moab, Defendant
visited the trailer court several times (R. 65).
Plaintiff performed labor on the construction of the
trailer court, but also employed third parties to do
certain of the work (R. 38, 63). Payment for the services
of these persons was made either from the gross collections of the trailer court (R. 63, 64), from the Defendant's personal funds (R. 38, 63, 64), or in some instances
by giving free rental or by the transfer of certain of
the realty which Defendant had purchased (R. 63).
During the period from May, 1954, to July 1955,
rentals for use of the trailer court facilities were collected (R. 62). The Plaintiff states that all such rentals
were collected by third parties hired by him to represent

5
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him for this purpose (R. 62, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 11, 18).
Such third persons issued receipts for such money
collected and retained a carbon copy of such receipts.
The carbons, together with the money collected, were
turned over to the Plaintiff (R. 62, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18).
Subsequently, Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant such
carbons of the receipts, together with copies of bills
and other records in his possession. None of the monies
collected were turned over to or sent to the Defendant
(R. 28, line 1; 54, 56, 134). At the trial the Plaintiff
testified that the Defendant made some collections while
visiting the trailer court (R. 66), but that he personally
had made none (R. 62). The Defendant stated she had
made some collections while at Moab (R. 85), but that
none of the money collected by herself or by Plaintiff,
or by those persons hired by Plaintiff, was ever retained
by or delivered to her (R. 86).
Testimony as to the amount of monies collected by
Plaintiff is conflicting. Plaintiff states that the average
monthly collections came to approximately $240 a month
(R. 41). The receipts for the same period, as placed in
evidence by the Plaintiff show collections by him in the
total amount of $5,569.39 (R. 185). Similar discrepancies exist as to the disposition of the money collected.
Plaintiff stated that he paid trailer court bills (R. 41,
Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18) and payments for labor and materials (R. 41, Ex. 2: Dep. \T~I 18). Plaintiff also stated
that he made \Yithdra\Yals for personal expenses, including a dollar a day for living expenses (R. 41, 53,
54, 56, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 26), $45 a month for some seven
months for car payments (R. 42, 53, Ex. 2: Dep. VM
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27), and payments to his wife in Salt Lake City (R. 42,
53, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 27). Plaintiff further stated that
insufficient funds were available for improvements to
the trailer court, that he had to secure additional monies
from Defendant, and that her failure to provide sufficient funds held him up (R. 41, 59, 63, 64).
During the trial, Defendant called as its witness,
Frank Vance, a certified public accountant with the firm
of Ernst and Ernst, who testified that he had examined
Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 through 14, and Defendant's Exhibit D. 15, which were all the receipts and records of
disbursements which were available to the parties (R.
144). Mr. Vance stated that he could not certify that
the records were a complete record of the business
transactions, but that based on the records before him,
certain conclusions could be drawn (R. 148). The summary by Mr. Vance for the period of six (6) months
ending December 31, 1954, and the six (6) months ending
June 30, 1955, show the following (R. 185), with a twelve
(12) month total added :
(Summary set forth on p. 8)
Defendant testified that she secured the money paid
by her from some she had saved and some she borrowed
(Ex. 4: Dep. GL 15, 21). In addition some payments
were made by Defendant by conveying lots (Ex. 4: Dep.
GL 16). Plaintiff stated that he withdrew money for his
expenses from the business (R. 21, 23, 41) but that he
had no savings, no other source of income than the one
month of work on the post office (R. 52) and the one
hundred dollars he borrowed from his brother (R. 52).
7
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Defendant
Cash Receipts

00

Business
Disbursements
Excess (Deficit)
of Cash Receipts
Over Business
Disbursements

0
0

0

2,250.33
2,492.33 4, 742.66
(2,250.33)
(2,492.33)
(4,742.66)

Plaintiff
2,629.89
2,939.50 5,569.39
422.14
524.99

947.13

Total

Other
0
0

0

2,629.89
2,939.50 5,569.39

138.91
485.69

624.60

2,811.39
3,503.01 6,314.39

--(138.91)
( 485.69)

2,207.75
2,414.51
4,622.26
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(181.49)
(563.51)
(624.60)

(745.00)

Plaintiff stated that receipts were to be used for trailer
court improvements when available (R. 37) but that
very little was (R. 56). Defendant stated that Plaintiff
was to get receipts and those were to compensate him
(R. 116, 117, Ex. 4: Dep. GL 10, 23) but that she was to
receive part of profits, if any (R. 116, Ex. 2: Dep. GL 23),
and there was no understanding Plaintiff could keep
receipts over and above expenses (R. 133).
Regarding disposition of receipts and withdrawals,
Plaintiff stated that he considered the monies taken by
him as expense money and not as either income or a
loan (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25). Defendant filed a Federal
income tax for 1954 (Exhibit 13) taking a depreciation
on installed property and furnishings valued at $532.54
and on six cabins and one lavatory valued at $2,097.57.
Rent on six frame cabins was shown as $2,118 and
expenses as $3,243. 70. No item reflected any sums withdrawn by Plaintiff. The 1955 Federal income tax of
Defendant (Ex. 14) covers the entire calendar year,
and again reflects no monies withdrawn by Plaintiff.
About mid-July, 1955, the Defendant and a friend
visited the trailer court in Moab (R. 97). At this time
the improvements of the trailer court consisted of the
six wood cabins, two bathhouses with washing facilities,
two septic tanks, and two wells (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 8, 12).
The Plaintiff testified that he stated that at this time
the work of setting up the trailer court was finished
(R. 37, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 23), and that he advised the
Defendant that a woman could ''take care of this part
of it" (R. 42) and that he asked the Defendant if she
9
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desired to ''stay down there'' (R. 42). Plaintiff also
testified that he asserted a desire to return to his wife
in Salt Lake City but that he desired to return to the
trailer court in the fall or winter (R. 43, Ex. 2: Dep. VM
23, 24). Testimony by the Defendant was that Plaintiff
said "he wasn't happy, he was tired of Moab and had
had all he wanted of that kind of life" (R. 98). The
friend's testimony was that she was with Plaintiff and
Defendant most of the time they were together during
the trip to Moab and that she did not hear Plaintiff
make any statement of an intention to return (R. 98).
Plaintiff returned to Salt Lake City on July 20,
1955 (R. 40), in the company of the Defendant and her
friend, with Defendant driving one of Plaintiff's two
cars, one of which had a trailer and the other of which
'vas quite old (Ex. 4: Dep. GL 12). Plaintiff stated that
he "left tools down there" (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 30), but
Defendant testified that he took his possessions with
him (R. 121). The Plaintiff stated that at the time he
left Moab ''everything that had been mutually owed
from the receipts of the trailer court had been settled
(R. 59, Ex. 2: Dep. VM 18). Defendant stated that
Plaintiff moved out (R. 121) and that he wanted to
leave Moab (R. 88).
On July 25, 1955, Plaintiff started work as a carpenter in Salt Lake City (Ex. 2: Dep. VJ\i 28), and he
testified both that he has been continuously employed
since leaving Maob and that he had not (R. 64, Ex. 2:
Dep. VM 29). Plaintiff has not returned to Moab since
July, 1955 (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25).

10
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After Plaintiff left Moab, Defendant hired a woman
to run the trailer court (Dep. VM 24). When the City
of Moab passed a tax on trailer homes, the trailer court
business declined drastically (Ex. 4 : Dep. GL 19).
Thereafter, the Defendant closed the trailer court, but
allowed the woman to live there and make rentals if
she wished, but to pay all bills and take care of the
property ( R. 123).
On July 27, 1956, Plaintiff :filed this suit against
the Defendant alleging a partnership agreement, the
conduct of the trailer court business as a partnership,
and the wrongful exclusion of the Plaintiff from the
business (R. 1). Plaintiff prayed for a receivership,
dissolution, accounting, distribution of partnership
assets, and for punitive damages (R. 2).
On September 3, 1957, the court made findings of
fact and conclusions of law (R. 187, 188, 189) and based
thereon entered its judgment awarding a sum of money
to the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, and also
decreeing a system of equal distribution of the buildings and improvements upon the property (R. 190). It
is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE EVIDE.NCE' IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·R.T
THE FINDING OF THE c·ouRT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP
11
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AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND RUNNING OF A TRAILER. COURT.

POINT II.
'fHE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN JULY,

1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS TO
INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE AS
OF T'HAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED AND
TERMINATED.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION
OF P'URP·ORTED PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN MANNER
CONTRAR.Y TO· UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, SEC. 48-1-37.

POINT IV.
THE JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO
NOT SUPP'ORT THE JUDGMENT.

.A.RGU~IENT

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFE·NDANT ENT'ERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND RUNNING OF A TRAILER COURT.
1~
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One of the findings made by the. trial court is :

'' 1. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a
Partnership Agreement for the construction and
running of a Trailor (sic) Court. '' ( R. 187).
This court has the responsibility to review the evidence. Nokes v. Continental Minti.ng & Milling Co., 6
Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954, at 954 (1954).
That the parties' relationship might have resulted
1n a partnership with profit sharing aspects in the
future was not unlikely, but the only reliable evidence
in the record - the conduct of the parties themselves is conclusive to the effect that such had not yet been
their agreement. There is no disagreement that there
was an understanding between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant for the construction and running of a trailer
court at Moab, Utah. It does not follow that such an
understanding meets the legal requirements for a partnership. Unless a partnership is established the Plaintiff can not claim a partner's interest in the trailer
court, nor can he claim a partnership interest during
the period after the association is dissolved, nor a right
to any returns from the business after the. association
is both dissolved and terminated. The plaintiff has the
burden of proving the existence of a partnership.

Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 Utah 582, 39 P. 2d 1113
(1934);
Burnett v. Lemon, 185 Ore. 54, 199 P. 2d 910
(1948).
In Burnett v. Lemon, 185 Ore. 54, 199 P. 2d 910, 915
(1948) the Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case strikingly
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similar on its facts to the present controversy, adopted
the rule of 40 Am. J ur., Partnership, Sec. 43, p. 156:
''In determining whether an actual partnership relation arises from or exists by virtue of a
particular agreement, one of the most widely
accepted tests applicable especially as between
the parties themselves, irrespective of the rights
of third persons, is whether it was the intention
of the parties to be partners. As between the
partners, partnership rests on mutual consent,
which may be manifested by the terms of their
agreement, the conduct of the parties to each
other under it, or by the circumstances generally
surrounding the transaction in question.''

Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-3, defines a partnership as:
" ... an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co owners a business for profit.''
(Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 6.)
There is no written agreement between the parties.
In such cases the Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-4 provides the following pertinent rules for determining the
existence of a partnership:
''In determining whether a partnership exists
these rules shall apply:

*

*

*
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of
itself establish a partnership, ,,. hether or not
the persons sharing them have a joint or
common right or interest in any property
from 'vhich the returns are derived.
14
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( 4) The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence
that he is a partner in the business, but no
such inference shall be drawn if such profits
were received in payment:

*

*

*

b. As wages of an employee or rent to a
landlord. ''
Of all the. possible elements included in a partnership agreement, an agreement to share profits is an
essential element of the partnership relation. As stated
in 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Sec. 17, p. 427:
''An agreement to share profits, although not
necessarily express, is an essential element of the
partnership relationship and, at least as between
the parties themselves, there must be a community
of interest, or right to participate in the profits of
the business or venture before it can be said that
an agreement of partnership has been entered
into and exists. The absence of a mutual interest
in the profits is conclusive that a partnership does
not exist . . . ''
Although a sharing of profits raises a presumption
of a partnership (Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189,
259 P. 313 (1927), such is not the result if such share
is received as wages of an employee. Utah Code Ann.
1953, 48-1-4 ( 4) (b). To constitute an element of a partnership, profits which a partner is to share must be real
profits, not wages.

Kuenzi v. Radloff, 253 Wis. 575, 34 N.W. 2d 798
(1948);

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 281, 231 P.
2d 540 (1951).

Jenkins v.

Ha~rris,

19 Tenn. App. 113, 83 S.W. 2d

562, 566 ( 1935) holds :
''An agreement to contribute labor in consideration of receiving a part of the profits of an
enterprise does not create a partnership, where
such profits are paid as compensation for the
labor contributed. Wagner v. Buttles, 151 Wis.
668, 139 N.W. 425, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 144, 147."
Further, in Keller v. Wixon, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.
2d 118 (1953) this court, in discussing admissibility of
evidence relating to services rendered by a partner said,
at page 119:
"Section 48-1-15 (6), U.C.A. 1953, provides
that 'No partner is entitled to remuneration for
acting in the partnership business, except that a
surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the
partnership affairs.' To the same effect is Forbes
v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772, 775, wherein
we stated: 'The amount of compensation either
party in a partnership or joint venture is entitled
to receive, in the absence of contract otherwise, is
dependent upon the profits made from such joint
venture'.''
The parties clearly agreed that Plaintiff "'BS to be
allowed to withdraw sums of money for his personal
needs. However, the nature of such withdrawals and
vvhat amounts \\7 ere to be \vithdra"'1l is not clearly stated
by either party. Both testified that they expected proceeds from the trailer court operation to be used for
16
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expenses of clearing the land and making other improvements, but that such receipts were not, or did not appear
to be adequate to provide much help and that Defendant
had to supply necessary funds from her personal funds.
Regarding the withdrawals made by him, Plaintiff, when
asked if he offered to pay back any of the money he had
taken during the time he was in Moab, replied: ''No.
That wasn't the bargain.' (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25). He
further stated : ''My time was worth her money. Time
is money.'' and denied that he considered the money a
loan or salary or anything except possibly expense
money. (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25, 26). Whatever the understanding of the parties may have been, it was indefinitely
stated by both at the trial.
Other evidence available in the record sheds more
light on the nature of the arrangement between the
parties, but indicates that there is no mutual understanding sufficient to support the finding of a partnership.
The Plaintiff's own evidence shows that a minimum
of some $5,569.39 for which receipts were issued or which
he otherwise is shown to have received for the trailer
court, came into Plaintiff's hand up to July 1, 1955 (R.
185). The records on expenditures placed in evidence
by Plaintiff account for expenditures of $947.13 (R. 185)
in the same period, exclusive of withdrawals by Plaintiff. An additional $624.60 was expended, which could
not be identified as to whether paid by Plaintiff from
business collections or from personal funds of Defendant (R. 185).
17
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Even if the Plaintiff is placed in the most favorable
position by crediting him with these expenditures, a
balance of $3,997.66 is left, the disposition of which is
unexplained by Plaintiff. A specific breakdown on receipts and disbursements in July, 1955, is not shown in
the summaries in evidence and so is omitted here-.
Further, whether Plaintiff was working elsewhere during July, 1955, is not clear.
The Plaintiff has failed to account for an average
of $70.13 for each week of the 57 weeks from May 20,
1954, to July 1, 1955. If Plaintiff is considered not to
have also paid the additional $624.60, the average would
have been $81.09 a week.
The Plaintiff testified he estimated the value of
work performed by him to have been $90.00 a week (R.
27, Line 27). Plaintiff also testified that he works for
$2.85 an hour; (Ex. 2: Dep. V~1: 30), but stated his
present average monthly income to be $380.00 (R. 26,
line 27).
When four weeks are excluded to show the month
or more during which Plaintiff had full-time outside
employment, the weeldy average of funds received by
the Plaintiff without explanation of their disposition
would then be either $75.42 or $87.20.

By the Plaintiff's

evidence, it is shown that
from the trailer court operation and during his stay in
Moab, Plaintiff received into his possession and is
unable to account for a sum of money approximately
O\Yll
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equal to his normal income for a like period. In addition he received his living quarters (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 9).
This is the minimum and is shown by his evidence.
It is submitted that the evidence is preponderately
against existence of a partnership because; (1) Plaintiff received sums of money approximating his normal
income; (2) Plaintiff denies any obligation to repay
such sums (Ex. 2: Dep. VM 25, 26); and (3) no agreement between the parties is shown which would make
such arrangement a partnership understanding.
It is further submitted that only a finding that no
partnership existed is consistent with the evidence of
Plaintiff's need (R. 107); close family ties (R. 106);
assumption of all trailer court debts by Defendant (Ex.
2: Dep. VM 18, lines 29, 30; 19, lines 1, 2) ; and termination of the business association of the parties in July,
1955, without requiring Plaintiff to account fully for
collections and income received by him.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN JULY,
1955, THE PAR.TIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS TO
INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPE·NDITURES MADE AS
OF THAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEIN'G DISSO,LVED AND
TERMINATED.

In addition to finding that a partnership agreement
was entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant for
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the construction and running of a trailer court (Finding
1, R. 187), and that the land was not part of the partnership assets but belonged to Defendant (Finding 2, R.
187), the court also found that Plaintiff was to provide
his own labor and supervise construction and that
''profits were to pay for the improvements as far as
possible" (Finding 3, R. 187). No finding was made
regarding withdrawals made by Plaintiff or regarding
termination of the partnership, except insofar as they
may have been covered by finding 7 (R. 188), which is:
"7. In July, 1955, Plaintiff and Defendant
had an accounting as to income received and
expenditures made as of that time, and third
person was hired to run the business.''
It is difficult to determine the legal implication of
the Court's Finding 7. "Income" might mean collection
at the trailer court and not include payments by Defendant for capital and for operating expenses. ''Expenditures'' could mean capital and operating expenditures and still not include ''Tithdrawal of funds by the
Plaintiff.
The Defendant's position is that the parties terminated their business relationship in the trailer court
when Plaintiff left l\Ioab in July, 1955; that Plaintiff
thereafter had no further interest in the trailer court;
and that based on this understanding an exact determination of what each o'Yed the other 'Ya.s dispensed
\vith and 1hl\ accounts called eYen.
20
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The discussion under Point I, supra, is hereby incorporated by reference for the purpose of showing the
unreasonableness of any other conclusion.
The parties are not lawyers nor experienced 1n
operations of the character of the trailer court. It is
not likely that both parties understood that their business relations might be construed by law to be a partnership, nor that if they had so understood would have
known the significance of such partnership as applied to
their obligations. The questions involved are sufficiently
disputed to require decision in this appeal. It is also
unreasonable to assume that this niece, no matter how
generous and no matter how conscious of family ties
would knowingly agree to her uncle's having a continuing
one-half interest in the trailer court and at the same
time relinquish her right to repayment for monies advanced by her and give up her right to any excess of
funds the Plaintiff may have withdrawn. The Defendant
remained obligated for the debts of the trailer court; the
Plaintiff considered himself absolved of any responsibility for such debts. Such actions, when coupled with
a mutual agreement as to settlement, constitutes not
only a dissolution but also a termination of such partnership. Plaintiff took his possessions, including two
cars and a trailer, to Salt Lake City, and was assisted
by the Defendant and her friend. Plaintiff obtained
work immediately upon return to Salt Lake, and although
his testimony is conflicting seems to have continued to
work at all times therefter.
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ln the absence of a partnership agreement, the
business relation would clearly have been terminated.
A finding that such a partnership existed as a matter
of law required some determination as to whether such
partnership continued after July, 1955, and if so, until
when. The court makes no finding that the partnership
has ever been dissolved, but by considering records of
the operation of the trailer court only through December,
1956, in arriving at a purported accounting between the
parties, implies that dissolution occurred then.
If at all, this was a partnership by consent. The
rule regarding dissolution of such partnerships is stated
in 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Sec. 334, p. 847:
''No particular form of agreement is necessary to dissolve a partnership by consent. Such
dissolution may be accomplished either by an
express agreement or by words and acts implying
an intention to dissolve. A partnership entered
into verbally may be dissolved in the same manner. Dissolution may be sufficiently evidenced
by acts of all the partners showing their intention
that the partnership between them shall cease, or
by acts or conduct participated in, or assented to,
by all the partners, inconsistent with a continuation of the partnership between them, although
liquidation is not completed or some appearance
of partnership continue.''
In Fisher v. Fisher, 83 Cal . .L\pp. 2d 357, 188 P. 2d
802, (1948), at page 803, the court said:
"And, as stated in Griffeth v. Fehsel, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 605, 143 P. 2d 522, 524: 'Parties to
any sort of a business arrangement are their own
best judges of the accounts bet"~een themselves.
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They understand their own plans and purposes
as "\veil as their settlements and after they have
reached an understanding to dissolve and have
agreed upon an accounting, courts must not undo
such mutual, extra-judicial determinations. Branger v. Chevalier, 9 Cal. 353, 363; 20 Cal. Jur. 819,
820 '."

Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-28, provides:
"Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreements between
the partners :
(a) By the termination of the definite term
or particular undertaking specified in the
agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when
no definite term or particular undertaking is
specified.

*

*

*

*

(2) In contravention of the agreement between
the partners, where the circumstances do not
permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of
any partner at any time. * * * ''
Even if a partnership existed, and even if the
Plaintiff did not subjectively intend that it be terminated
in July, 1955, his leaving and working elsewhere, the
acts of the Defendant at that time, and, as the Plaintiff
testified, her acts in preventing his return to Moab, dissolved the partnership. Such was the right of either
party. An accounting or other settlement would follow
such dissolution, leading to a final termination of the
partnership.
2?,
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If the accounting found by the Court (Finding 7,
R. 188) was not coincident with a complete termination,
the rights of the Plaintiff depend upon the time the dissolution did take place. A finding of wrongful exclusion
is precluded because the partnership is one at will, and
since there is neither evidence to support or a finding
of any fraudulent conduct, the rule of Graham v. Street,
109 Utah 460, 166 P. 2d 524 (1946), which allowed
sharing of profits after dissolution, is inapplicable.
It is submitted that the trial court erred in not finding as part of Finding 7 (R. 188), that coincident with
the accounting bet\veen the parties, the partnership, if
any, was dissolved and terminated with neither party
having any claim against the other thereafter.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION
OF P'URPORTED PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN MANNER
CONTRAR.Y TO UTAH CO·DE ANN. 1953, SEC. 48-1-37.

Uta.h Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37, provides in pertinent parts :
''In settling accounts between the partners
after dissolution the following rules shall be
observed, subject to any- agreement to the contrary:

* * * *
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank
in order of payment, as follows :
(a) Those owing· to creditors other than
partners.
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(b) Those owing to partners other than for
capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners ln respect of
capital.
(d) Those owing to partners ln respect of
profits.''
a. The trial court had before it a purported claim
by Ira Niillett which, if valid, would have to be paid
before any distribution to the partners. (R. 72).
b. The trial court has before it evidence of capital
contribution by Defendant in the amount of $4,105.11
for buildings and improvements and for equipment in
the period ending July 1, 1955, as well as additional
business disbursements by Defendant in the same period
of $637.55, making a total of $4,742.66 (R. 185). The
court makes no provision for repayment of such expenditures by Plaintiff from her personal funds, nor for
reimbursement to her of similar expenditures and advancement of capital subsequent to July 1, 1955.
In Tiffan.y v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P. 2d 939,
940 (1943), the court said, concerning a joint venture
to which it applied the rules of partnership law:
''The trial court found that the agreement
was a joint venture. The general rule applicable
to dissolution in such cases is that in the absence
of an express agreement to the contrary, the
person advancing capital is entitled to its return
before there is a division of income or profits.
. . . In the present case there was no specific
agreement as to division of assets upon dissolution. Therefore a division and distribution into
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equal parts before the return of capital, all of
which had been advanced by one party, would
be improper.''
This is the rule of Utah Code Anrn. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37,
but is not the rule applied by the trial court.
In addition there is authority for the rule that a
non-capital contributing partner is not entitled to share
in the capital upon dissolution. H'IJ/Ybter v. Allen, 147 P.
2d 213, 174 Ore. 261 ( 1944), modified on other grounds,
148 P. 2d 936, 174 Ore. 26.
c. The trial court had before it evidence of excess
withdrawals by Plaintiff but makes no provision for
repayment of withdrawals.
Finding 7 purports to discharge Plaintiff of any
obligation to make such repayment, but as discussed
under Point II, supra, which discussion is hereby incorporated by reference, such finding must imply a dissolution of the partnership and termination as well,
with all claims by each partner against one another and
against the partnership assets settled in full.
d. The trial court purported to distribute net profits
after July, 1955, when in fact the net profit so determined ineluded pre-July, 1955 items (Finding 8, R. 188).
On page 184 of the record, the certified public accountant shows cash receipts for the period July 1, 1954,
to the end of 1956 by the three figures of $5,569.39,
$5,067 .18, and $4,362.04, ,making total receipts of
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$14,998.61. ''Business Disbursements'' for the same
periods are shown as $6,314.39, $3,146.82, and $3,974.68,
making a total of $13,435.89. Subtracting the business
disbursements from the cash receipts leaves a sum of
$1,562.72, which is to the penny the amount found by
the trial court to be the net profits since July, 1955.
e. Further, the trial court failed to recognize the
dissolution of such partnership as may have existed
either in July, 1955, when Plaintiff left Moab, or at
such time thereafter as Plaintiff testifies Defendant
refused to allow him to return ( R. 44). The dissolution
having occurred at one time or the other, termination of
the partnership would have proceeded thereafter (Utah
Code An!flA. 1953, Sec. 48-1-27) pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37.
f. The trial court failed to give consideration during
the period after such dissolution to the respective capital
interests of the parties.
This court stated several of the rules applicable to
this type of controversy in Graha;m v. Street, 2 Utah 2d
144, 270 P. 2d 456, 459 (1954). Therein the court compared the rules applicable to a fraudulent dissolution
and continued use of property with the rules applicable
where the dissolution is not fraudulent. This court said:
''There is another reason why neither compensatory nor punitive damages should have been
allowed. The Uniform Partnership Act, Utah
Code Ann. 1953, 48-1-28, establishes in each
partner an indefeasible right to dissolve the
partnership even where the partners covenant
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that the partnership will continue for a number
of years, the only consequence being that in a
partnership for a definite term the dissolving
partner subjects himself to a claim for damages
for breach of contract and for an accounting.
Atha v. Atha, 303 Mich. 611, 6 N.W. 2d 897. This
being so in a partnership for a definite term, a
fortiori in a partnership for at will, where an
accounting must be the exclusive remedy since
no contract has been breached. Normally, this
accounting encompasses that interval between
formation of the partnership and the time when
actual notice is brought home to the partner that
the relationship is to be dissolved. Fisher v.
Fisher, 83 Cal. App. 2d 357, 188 P. 2d 802. However, a different situation is presented where the
expulsion is fraudulent and there is continued
use of the partnership assets. * * *. ''
Except in such cases as Graham v. Street, 109 Utah
460, 166 P. 2d 524 (1946) dealing with fraud, the general
rule is that a partner is entitled to subsequently earned
profits in the proportion that his interest in capital or
assets used to earn such profits bears to the total capital
or assets used to earn such profits. 40 Am. J ur. Partnership, Sec. 386, p. 397, n. 16. 80 A.L.R. 48. Where there
is no interest in capital, such a partner does not share
in subsequent profits. 80 A.L.R. 68.

Am. Jur., Partnership, See. 390, p. 398 states
the universally accepted rule applicable to the facts of
this case:
40

''The right of a partner to share in the
profits earned by the continuation of a partnership business after the dissolution. of the firm is
founded upon the use to ''rhieh such partner's
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interest in the capital of the firm has been put
in earning these subsequent profits, and if the
partner claiming an interest in the profits earned
after the dissolution of the partnership has no
interest in the capital of the firm after dissolution, he is not entitled to share in the profits
earned. The same result is reached where the
complaining partner's interest in the capital is
negligible . . . . It would seem that if, by reason
of ... the excessive indebtedness of the partner
to the firm, the partner has no interest, or at least
a nominal interest, remaining in the firm, he
should not be entitled to a share of the subsequently earned profits.''
g. The trial court erred in granting an In Personam
money judgment against the Defendant.
Because of the necessity for winding up affairs in
accord with the law applicable to partnerships, it has
been held that ''. . . (a) personal judgment cannot be
entered against a parnter in a suit for accounting and
settlement until all the partnership assets have been
converted into money, the debts paid and a final balance
ascertained.'' Steinberg v. Goldstein, 129 Cal. App. 2d
682, 278 P. 2d 22 (1955).
In Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal. App. 2d 479, 296
P. 2d 834 (1956) the court said that a personal judgment
would not, as a general rule, lie until the assets had been
converted into money, debts paid, and a :final balance
struck between the partners. An exception would be
where there were found to be no third party liabilities.
Such a :finding cannot be inferred from the court's failure
29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to so find, for there was evidence to the effect that there
were outstanding third party liabilities.
Even if an unterminated partnership existed, there
has been no accounting as the complaint requested. The
court found that the defendant had contributed her own
funds for the construction and operation of the business,
but has failed to consider repayment of such contributions ahead of a distribution of assets as profits. Such
is required by Utah Code Arun. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37,

Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, 184 P.
2d 688 (1947);
Olmo v. Olmo, 56 Cal. App. 2d 590, 133 P. 2d 866

(1943).
If upon a proper determination of the matter it
should be determined that there are no third party debts
owing, assuming an unterminated partnership, it would
then be proper to ascertain the value of the partnership
assets and to strike a balance between the parties
without a sale, but not without a proper consideration
of the withdrawals of the plaintiff which must be balanced against any interest in assets or profits he may
have otherwise coming ot him, and not without a repayment of the advances and capital of the defendant. And
in the event the assets are insufficient to repay the
defendant her capital and a.dYances and her share of
the profits, if any, it ,,..in be incumbent upon the plaintiff to contribute his proportionate share of such loss,
as well as account for his "Tithdra",.als.

Utah Code An.(n. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37 (1) (b).
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h. The trial court erred in applying the system provided in the Occupying Claimants Statute (Utah Code
Ann. 1953, Sees. 57-6-1 thru 8) to distribution of purported partnership assets.
Even assuming that the buildings and improvements
are partnership assets, the court's judgment (R. 190)
is not in accord with the rules for distribution of partnership assets which provide a detailed system and set
of priorities in the distribution of partnership assets.
Utah Code An;n.. 1953, Sec. 48-1-37.
The plaintiff and his brother, Ira, testified as to
possible outstanding liabilities (R. 39, 72). The court
made no finding on the question of third party liabilities.
Since it is part of the plaintiff's case to prove he merits
a distribution, such a finding is a necessary element to
support his judgment. Its omission infers a finding
against Plaintiff.
Mosley v. Magnolia, 45 N.M. 230, 114 P. 2d 740
1941);
Coffinberry v. J.llcClellan, 164 Ind. 131, 73 N.E.
97 (1905).

Further the plaintiff testifies that the defendant
provided money from her own personal funds for the
construction and operation of the trailer court (R. 39,
41, 59, 63). The court's sixth finding expressly recognizes that the defendant used some of her own money
in the operation. (Finding 6, R. 188)
Still further, the court found that the ''land was to
be provided by the Defendant and not to be partnership
assets" (Finding 2, R. 187). Evidence shows Defendant
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made some payments for operation of the trailer court,
by giving land. No credit has been given Defendant for
such payments. Also, there is no indication of any
payments or credits to Defendant for rent. By the purported use of the Occupying Claimants Statute, the court
would be forcing Defendant to sell her land even though
she may have no desire to do so. Such a ruling would
be unreasonable against a third party landlord. It is
no less unreasonable in this case.
POINT IV.
THE JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW DO
NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT

For the reasons outlined in this Point, and in the
preceding points, the defendant submits that the judgment is not supported by the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law. Since a judgment is based upon the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it follows
that the judgment must fall.

U. S. v. Seminole Na.tion,. 299 U.S. 417, 57 S. Ct.
283, 81 L. Ed. 216 ( 1937).
Sinee the plaintiff has not seen fit to cross-appeal
or file a statement of points in the manner provided in
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he cannot attack the
court's failure to find.
U.R.C.P. 74(b):
U.R.C.P. 75(d):
Fo1uers ·v. Lau·son, 56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227 (1920);
LcT.,..1:nc l'. Tl'hitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2d
1910);
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W i.tkin, California Procedure 2229, Sec. 72;

H emigson v. Bank of .America, 32 Cal. 2d 240, 244,
195 P. 2d 777 (1948).
CONCLUSION
The Defendant submits that the evidence and the
findings of fact do not support a judgment for the Plaintiff. Exercise of this court's responsibility to review the
record and evidence before the trial court will substantiate the Defendant's position that there was no partnership between the parties, and that even if there were a
partnership such partnership was dissolved and terminated with an account stated when the Plaintiff left Moab
in July, 1955.
The remaining points in the Defendant's brief indicate wherein the judgment of the trial court is erroneous
in case Defendant's above position is not sustained by
this court.
Defendant prays that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and order judgment entered for
the Defendant, or if such reversal not be granted, that
a new trial be ordered with instructions consonant with
statutory law in order that the rights of the parties may
be protected by a full and accurate accounting.
Respectfully submitted,

H. BYRON MOCK and
ROBERT L. SCHMID
Attorneys for Appellan.t.
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